and United States v. Windsor
2 have had profound effects on the lives of same-sex couples and their families. That is, in California and in other states (including the District of Columbia) where marriage between two people of the same sex is legal, citizens now enjoy a very different legal landscape for their family planning. In my own life, the federal government can no longer treat my same-sex marriage as less of a marriage than an opposite-sex marriage. Now, my husband and I can enjoy the panoply of rights-state and federalthat stem from legal marriage. However, these cases had no effect on those individuals in U.S. jurisdictions whose laws hold as void any marriage contracted between parties of the same sex.
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into question whether and to what extent any marriage must be recognized under the Constitution-we are in a critical historical moment where figuring out what it means to be queer in America not only implicates navigating the socio-legal structure that binds queer lives and identities, but also requires that conscientious work be done in determining the limits of that structure. After all, what takes precedence-opposite-sex marriage, with its status as a fundamental right, or my skim-milk marriage to a man? 9 In this Note, I will examine what might happen to me if I were to move back to Lexington, Kentucky-the city of my birth-and apply for a marriage license with a woman. Would I be turned away for being currently married to a man? Would what I seek to do be criminal under Kentucky law? If so, would I have the right to compel the issuance of such a marriage license, despite the validity of my marriage in New York, or to stop criminal proceedings on constitutional grounds? These questions may seem silly, but the principles behind them have a very real importance for what it means to be married in America, where fundamentally irreconcilable state laws control our legal status.
I. NON-RECOGNITION OF MARITAL STATUS: IS MY INVALID SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AN IMPEDIMENT TO OPPOSITE-SEX MARRIAGE?
Kentucky law prohibits many types of marriages. 10 Amid these, the law specifically states that marriage is "prohibited and void . . . [w] here there is a husband or wife living, from whom the person marrying has not been divorced." 11 Kentucky's law, finicky though one might expect it to be about such dickered terms, is surprisingly silent as to what a husband or a wife is. But Black's Law Dictionary tells 9 See Oral Argument at 71: 15-16, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) , available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio _detail.aspx?argument=12-307&TY=2012 (audio of Justice Ginsburg's comment to attorney Paul Clement, who defended the Defense of Marriage Act before the Supreme Court, in which she rhetorically referred to same-sex marriage as "skim-milk marriage"). 10 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.010 (West, WestlawNext through the end of the 2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session) (prohibiting and voiding marriages between any people with a half-or whole-blood relationship of closer than second cousins); id. § 402.020 (prohibiting and voiding marriages where one of the parties has been declared mentally disabled by a court, when not solemnized or contracted in the presence of an authorized solemnizing person or body, between members of the same sex, between more than two persons, and-with certain exceptionswith a person under sixteen years of age).
11 Id. § 402.020(1)(b).
266
CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:263 us that husband means a married man and wife a married woman. As used and recognized in the law of the Commonwealth, "marriage" refers only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.
13
This definition is essentially adopted from case law in which Kentucky's highest court upheld a county clerk's determination denying two women a marriage license, not because a statute forbade it-or even defined marriage at all-but because the union they were seeking as members of the same sex did not meet the common dictionary definition of marriage.
14 For this reason, my husband and I, under Kentucky law, fail to meet the legal standard for married. Our civil status as married is not predicated on being one man and one woman. Our association is therefore not even founded on the distinction of sex, 15 a basic requirement of the civil status of married in Kentucky. As expected, my marriage in New York does not meet the definition of marriage in Kentucky.
The Commonwealth's Office of the Attorney General gives further guidance on the issue. In a 2007 opinion essentially forbidding the public university system from giving domestic partner benefits to same-sex partners on constitutional grounds, the However, in order to prevent my marriage to a woman, Kentucky may be able to recognize my husband and my status as married via a legal fiction. In a recent child custody case, the Court of Appeals overturned a family court's decision to use the legal fiction that a same-sex couple was married for the purposes of naming one member of the couple a legal stepparent. 20 The Court of Appeals found this to be an inappropriate derogation from the very clear meaning of Kentucky's bans on same-sex marriage. 21 The court reasoned that a legal fiction so blatantly at odds with the express words of the General Assembly and the Constitution would only have been appropriate if it were necessary to stop an "absurd and unworkable" result from occurring that would be directly at odds with Kentucky public policy. 22 No precedent exists to give an idea of whether having a legal marriage in Kentucky while also having a In Kentucky, bigamy is the felony of marrying someone while knowing that one already has a husband or wife. 34 The current definition of this crime is most likely an adaptation of the corresponding section of the Model Penal Code. 35 An essential element of bigamy, which Kentucky must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the defendant was validly married when the second marriage occurred.
36 While some commenters take for granted that this burden to prove a valid predicate marriage would prevent a state with a marriage-defining amendment such as Kentucky's from convicting a bigamist whose first marriage was to a same-sex partner in another state, 37 that proposition is not supported by the law. The logically correct answer is that husband or wife as used in the criminal definition of bigamy must be controlled by the same meaning of marriage that would control for the invalidity of my New York marriage. How could it be that, if marriage were defined in Kentucky's Constitution and statutes as only a marriage between a man and a woman, the criminal law could recognize an out-of-state same-sex marriage as a valid marriage?
Kentucky criminal law is subject to the canon of construction that its provisions be liberally construed according to "the fair import of their terms . . . and to effect the objects of the law."
38 Thus, a court would have an easier time relying on a legal fiction of my New York marriage, of the type discussed above, to contradict the plain meaning of the Kentucky Constitution and statutory regime. However, a court may not even need to fictionalize my marriage, as it would also have a long history of common law rules that support 32 Id. § 402.010 (1) If the predicate marriage for a bigamy prosecution occurred outside the state of prosecution, the validity of the marriage is an issue of fact: All that need be proved is that the marriage in fact took place and that such a marriage is in fact valid under the foreign law.
39 While this rule is old, it is still regarded as the valid common law rule by authoritative treatises. 40 If Kentucky courts adhere to the canon of construction that they are meant to give full effect to the objects of the law, adhering to a well-established doctrine that a foreign marriage need only to have been a valid marriage in the place where it was celebrated would foreclose the defense that the Kentucky Constitution precludes recognition of my same-sex marriage for any purpose, even in a criminal case for bigamy.
However, Kentucky's criminal bigamy statute contains a defense to the charge: the defendant believed he was legally eligible to remarry. 41 This defense specifically includes the belief that the predicate marriage was void.
42 At common law, this defense was not possible, as it was considered an impermissible mistake of law defense. 43 How this defense would work in Kentucky in light of its statutory and constitutional limitations on the definitions of marriage is unclear. Commonwealth,147 S.W. 376, 378 (Ky. 1912) , where Kentucky's highest court opined that proof that the predicate Illinois marriage was void under the laws of that state would have been a sufficient defense to an indictment for contracting a bigamous marriage in Kentucky. However, if a valid foreign marriage would be void because the parties were married in the foreign jurisdiction to evade the marriage laws of their domicile, then that marriage could not be the predicate marriage for a bigamy prosecution. State v. Fenn, 92 P. 417, 417-19 (Wash. 1907 Whether I were denied or granted a marriage license to a woman, I might run into legal problems giving rise to a constitutional claim. Could I have a court compel the county clerk to issue me the license? (The denial of a marriage license, at least theoretically, gives rise to a claim for injunctive relief of that nature.
45
) Could I have a court enjoin Kentucky from prosecuting me under its bigamy laws for exercising my fundamental right to marry a woman in these circumstances? At first, it seems these questions would arise under different constitutional theories, but the history of the right to marriage as a constitutional question shows the analysis is much more unified.
Loving v. Virginia, 46 in which the Supreme Court established the fundamental right to enter into opposite-sex marriages, 47 was a challenge to the constitutionality of Virginia's criminal prohibitions against its residents entering into interracial marriages in other states. 48 The Court recognized, as did the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in upholding the law, the white-supremacist policies behind these criminal "evasion" laws for interracial couples were the same as those that held such marriages void for civil purposes. 49 Of course, Loving did not just invalidate criminal marriage evasion statutes as applied to interracial couples: it invalidated the civil prohibitions on interracial marriage that were premised on the same policies and similarly interfered with the fundamental right to enter into opposite-sex marriage. Given this precedent, either the denial of a marriage license or a prosecution for bigamy may be analyzed under the same standard.
Under the Kentucky Constitution, no government official may exercise "arbitrary power" over the "lives, liberty and property of freemen." 50 The constitution equally guarantees that "no grant of 45 This was, after all, the remedy sought in However, in recent years, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that, in reviewing Kentucky laws for their constitutionality under Kentucky's equal protection guarantees for denials of a fundamental right, the same rules of constitutional scrutiny that would apply under the relevant federal constitutional law apply in Kentucky. 53 In any event, the Kentucky Constitution can guarantee no fewer rights than the federal Constitution.
54 While all states have a nearly plenary power to determine marital status within their borders, these regulations of marriage must comport with the federal Constitution.
55
It is axiomatic that the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution contains a fundamental and individual right to marry one person of the opposite sex. 56 This right is both a substantive due process right and an associational right under the First Amendment incorporated via the Fourteenth, though the standard of review under either theory is, apparently, the same. 57 In reviewing a state's interference with the right to marry one opposite-sex partner under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must determine whether the interference is a "direct and substantial burden" and that this provision encompasses a guarantee of due process and equal protection of law 59 If the interference does not rise to that level, the interference will only be held unconstitutional if it cannot survive rational basis review.
60
The Sixth Circuit's conception of a "direct and substantial burden" on the right to marriage is an absolute bar to marriage based on a suspect classification (such as the criminal statute struck down in Loving) or where the state places such a financial or legal burden on individuals who wish to marry that they will probably never be able to get married, even if they theoretically could. 61 Thus, mere economic disincentives to marry a particular person or financial burdens incident to being married, such as disqualifications for social welfare or for public employment based on being in or entering into a marital relationship, do not rise to the level of "direct and substantial" burden. REV. 1013 REV. (2010 . At any rate, Kentucky's circuit court jurisdiction for the invalidation of a marriage made prohibited and void by Kentucky law extends only to the parties to the marriage and is limited in time to within a year of the filing party's having learned of the impediment. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.120(2)(b). Though I have no citation for it, my husband and I learned of each other's being male much longer than a year ago. As such, it seems that we would not be entitled to an annulment in Kentucky regardless of the question of the meaning of marriage in the jurisdictional statute.
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could show the interference protected sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to protect only those interests.
A. Kentucky's Potential Interests in Preventing an Opposite-Sex Marriage
As in all heightened constitutional scrutiny analyses, Kentucky would be required to offer reasons for its interference with my right to opposite-sex marriage based on my void-and-unavoidable same-sex marital status. 65 The Commonwealth would likely offer different arguments from those that same-sex marriage opponents would offer.
66 After all, I would be trying to marry a woman, not a man. Instead, the Commonwealth's reasons would likely be the arguments that are used to justify the prohibitions on plural marriage as a restriction in opposite-sex marriage.
In recent cases, state and federal courts have reviewed prohibitions on plural marriage for their constitutionality under various theories. 67 All of these cases start from the premise that the Supreme Court has ruled, and regularly affirmed, that Congress's prohibition of plural marriage in the territories of the United Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 666-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008 ) (holding that a defendant was not denied constitutional rights when he had not been entitled to the spousal defense in a proceeding for statutory rape on the theory that the girl he had had sex with was his celestial wife based on their plural marriage); but see Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1217-25 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that Utah's prohibition on merely purporting to be married to multiple people was a facial violation of the Free Exercise Clause and the substantive due process right described in Lawrence v. Texas). These cases show state-interest reasoning that flows from both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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States was not violative of the federal Constitution. 68 Even in the Zablocki opinion, the Court tends to agree that a state can legitimately outlaw plural marriages.
69
The various reasons the Supreme Court gives to prohibit plural marriage in Reynolds v. United States include that this restriction vindicates a longstanding tradition in Anglo-American law against permitting plural marriage, that plural marriage causes patriarchal despotism incompatible with American civil society, and that plural marriage is more suited to "African" and "Asiatic" life. 70 In State v. Green, the Supreme Court of Utah analyzed and approved the state's putatively compelling reasons for outlawing plural marriage: the vast network of legal rights premised on monogamous marriage, 71 preventing marital fraud and misuse of state benefits associated with marriage, 72 and protecting "vulnerable individuals" (women and children) from "[c]rimes not unusually attendant to 68 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); see also Potter, 760 F.2d at 1069-70 (showing how frequently the Court has affirmed Reynolds). Congress would proceed not only to criminalize plural marriages in the territories, but would go on to enact laws that stripped the Church of Latter-Day Saints of its corporate status and seized its property. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 66 (1890) (upholding the statute). After the Church abandoned plural marriage as a tenet of the faith, Congress returned the property it had seized to the Church. See S. REP. NO. 95-1275, at 2 (1978) . The federal bans on plural marriage were repealed in 1978. Act of Nov. 2, 1978 , Pub. L. No. 95-584, 92 Stat. 2483 . Congress repealed its criminal bans on plural marriage as part of repealing the law that allowed for seizures from churches in the territories because, as the sponsors of the repeal argued, those laws were "antiquated and constitutionally suspect." 124 CONG. REC. 23816, 23895 (1978) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). The Office of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior even opined that the Supreme Court might find these laws unconstitutional because Congress had clearly put them forward only to harm Mormons and had stopped enforcing the law since the Church disavowed plural marriage. S. REP. NO. 95-1275 NO. 95- , at 6-7 (1978 . However, the Committee on Energy and National Resources clarified in approving the repeal of the laws criminalizing plural marriage federally that it did not intend to express a lack of support for such bans generally. Id. at 3. Concordantly, regulations from the Bureau of Indian Affairs still prohibit and void any marriages that are celebrated before the dissolution of either party's former marriage. 25 C.F.R. § 11.603(1)(a) (2013). However, tribes may use their powers to regulate domestic relations to permit marriages made void by this regulation. Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg. 54406, 54409 (Oct. 21, 1993) .
69 "Surely, for example, a State may legitimately say that no one can marry his or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can marry without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one can marry who has a living husband or wife." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring). However, on the same page, Justice Stewart disagreed with the majority that there was a constitutional right to marriage, calling it a privilege. Id. Courts have moved away from the bare assertions in Reynolds that plural marriage's African, Asiatic, and despotic characteristics were enough to justify banning it, advancing toward a less moralistic-and more compelling-analysis focused on protecting women, children, and marriage itself.
76 But does this shift represent a genuine change in policy and reasoning behind these bans?
This change in analysis occurs, maybe coincidentally, after the establishment of the constitutional principle that a mere moral aversion or a simple desire to cause harm to a group are no longer recognized as valid state interests.
77 Dictum from the Windsor case even implies that protecting the definition of marriage itself is not a legitimate governmental interest, because it manifests a bare desire to harm a particular group based on moral aversion. 528 (1973) , can be generally stated as a "bare congressional desire to harm" a particular group in exercising its rights is not a legitimate governmental interest, even under the low standards of rational basis review. Id. at 534-35. This doctrine has been applied to strike down laws that rest on "irrational" prejudices. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that was suspected of resting on a bare desire to harm and exclude people with intellectual disabilities). The doctrine protects against state statutes that single out a particular minority group for broad legal disabilities. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) . It has been extended to insulate private, consensual sexual relationships between adults from criminal laws founded only on moral disapproval of those relationships and the people most likely to engage in them. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583. It now also applies where Congress's intent in passing a law is to harm a group based on moral disapproval of the exercise of one of its rights under state law. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-94. 78 Windsor uses evidence that the House of Representatives' legislative intent in- [Vol. 17:263 scholarship, even when it argues contra plural marriage recognition and decriminalization, details a history demonstrating that American prohibitions on plural marriage were strengthened, or even adopted, in order to express moral opposition to plural marriage and harm groups who practiced it. 79 In fact, much like the climate of suppressing same-sex marriages behind the Defense of Marriage Act a century later, 80 Congress's 19th-century assertion of its right to regulate some aspects of the family, despite the traditional state-law character of that body of law, was explicitly borne of the desire to eradicate the Mormon practice of plural marriage to safeguard the institution of marriage and an amorphous concept of national virtue.
81
To no small extent, this idea of national virtue revolved around protecting what a moral American (i.e., white and Christian) life looks like from the perceived threat of multiculturalism.
82
In refusing to recognize a validly celebrated out-of-state miscegenetic marriage, when such a marriage would be void under its law, the Tennessee Supreme Court famously ruled that to do otherwise could leave Tennessee in a situation where " [t] he Turk or Mohammedan, with his numerous wives, may establish his harem at the doors of the capitol," calling such a situation "revolting" and "uncluded the protection of traditional marriage from "homosexual couples" and their efforts to redefine marriage to sustain the Court's proposition that the Defense of Marriage Act's definition of marriage was adopted with inimical intent to harm samesex couples who were validly married under state law. 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 79 WOMEN & L. 131, 135-38 (2004) ; see also Vazquez, supra note 73, at 227-32. 80 The parallels between, and the possibility of distinguishing, the moral disapproval of same-sex marriage and plural marriage led to much ado at the time of the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 55-60 (1997) . 81 Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 REV. , 1357 REV. -65 (1998 . 82 Reynolds itself corroborates this with its focus on the "African and Asiatic" nature of plural marriage, which was a practice "odious" to countries in Europe's north and west, in holding that Mormon plural marriage was a major deviation from the wellestablished norms of Anglo-American society not worth protecting constitutionally as a religious practice. 98 U.S. at 164-65. Congress seemed to agree when it passed its ban on plural marriage in the territories in 1862, arguing just two years earlier that the Framers of the Constitution "surely . . . never intended that the wild vagaries of the Hindoo or the ridiculous mummeries of the Hottentot should be ennobled" by the protection of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. H.R. REP. NO. 83, at 2 (1860).
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natural." 83 Plural marriage "was natural for people of color, but unnatural for White Americans of Northern European descent" being white and plurally married was to become non-white. 84 By contrast, state and federal governments as a matter of course recognized plural marriages as valid for both state and federal law purposes when they were validly contracted among Native Americans on their tribal lands in accordance with tribal customs, even when they would not recognize plural marriages occurring in other nations among those who later took up residence in the United States. 85 Courts also found ways to deal with the rights emanating from validly contracted plural marriages-so long as no one had to suffer the affront of normalized non-monogamous cohabitation. 86 Thus, while states and the federal government railed against recognizing plural marriages, they found ways to handle the occasional plural marriage and accorded rights to all the parties to it, so long as it was properly confined and could not pose a threat to public morals by seeming, for lack of a better word, normal.
The Reynolds Court found that criminalization and restriction of plural marriage in America vindicated the Anglo-American moral tradition preexisting the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights. 87 The European history of the criminalization of bigamy, which flipped between a civil (i.e., criminal) and ecclesiastical offense, gives insight into the original moralizing function of those laws. 88 Bigamy became a civil offense in England and the United 83 State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872) . (To be fair, the court was characterizing plural marriage as revolting and unnatural along with interracial and incestuous marriage.) Whether the court conceived of "Turks" and "Mohammedans" as white is difficult to say. John Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness: Towards a Middle-Eastern Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) , discusses the "catch-22" of the simultaneous whiteness and racial othering that characterizes the Middle-Eastern and Arab experience in America much better than I ever could. 84 THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 207-29 (2010) . 86 Common law courts all over the world, even in the United States, recognized that so long as the plurally married foreigner (who is assumed to be non-white) were merely passing through, and the public policy of the state were not burdened by the prolonged cohabitation of the members of the multiparty marriage, or so long as the marriage's validity were limited to rights like succession, then there should be no reason to hold the marriage invalid. See the discussion in In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 500-02 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) . 87 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164-65 (1878) . 88 The Supreme Court offered a lengthy and detailed discussion of the history of bigamy and polygamy as criminal offenses in medieval Spain and the Spanish possessions that would later become Louisiana in Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. 553 (1860), which shows the political tensions inherent in morphing bigamy and polygamy from
